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 Wage Subsidy and Labour Market Flexibility in South Africa￿




In this paper, we use a highly disaggregate general equilibrium model to analyse the feasibility
of a wage subsidy to unskilled workers in South Africa, isolating and estimating its potential
employment e⁄ects and ￿scal cost. We capture the structural characteristics of the labour
market with several labour categories and substitution possibilities, linking the economy-wide
results on relative prices, wages, and employment to a micro-simulation model with occupational
choice probabilities in order to investigate the poverty and distributional consequences of the
policy. The impact of a wage subsidy on employment, poverty, and inequality in South Africa
depends greatly on the elasticities of substitution of factors of production, being very minimal if
unskilled and skilled labour are complements in production. The desired results are attainable
only if there is su¢ cient ￿ exibility in the labour market. Although the impact in a low case
scenario can be improved by supporting policies that relax the skill constraint and increase the
production capacity of the economy especially towards labour-intensive sectors, the gains from
a wage subsidy are still modest if the labor market remains very rigid.
1 Introduction
Despite a recent improvement in economic growth, unemployment in South Africa is still high. While
the unemployment rate has declined from 29.4 percent in 2001 to 26.7 percent in 2005 (StatsSA,
2006),1 employment growth is, on average, only 2.1 percent per year (see, for example, Bhorat, 2005).
That level of employment growth is slow relative to labour force growth, and therefore insu¢ cient to
deal with the severity of the unemployment problem. Using a broader de￿nition of unemployment
to include discouraged workers, unemployment in South Africa is approximately 30 percent for men
and 38 percent for women, and has almost doubled since the transition from Apartheid (Levinsohn,
2008). Reducing unemployment is therefore a major policy concern in South Africa and one policy
option being debated is a wage subsidy scheme - see, for example, recommendations made by the
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The South African labour market presents an interesting economic issue - if there are wage and
labour market rigidities in an economy, would a wage subsidy be able to reduce high structural
unemployment? Using the particular institutional situation of South Africa, this paper investigates
the circumstances by which a wage subsidy would generate signi￿cant employment e⁄ects. The
methodology employed is a disaggregative economic framework ￿which combines a general equilib-
rium model (commonly used in public ￿nance to look at ￿scal, welfare, and economy-wide e⁄ects of
a policy change), and a micro-simulation model with occupational choice probabilities to examine
the employment and distributional consequences at the micro-level. We brie￿ y review the unem-
ployment issues in South Africa and describe the approach adopted in the context of the paper￿ s
objectives.
1.1 Why Unemployment is High in South Africa
There is an extensive literature about South Africa￿ s labour market issues, which are selectively
summarised below. Three major and interrelated causes of unemployment are often cited: (i)
insu¢ cient economic growth, particularly in the tradable sectors; (ii) high real wages or labour
cost; and (iii) labour market rigidities and other structural problems in the labour markets. In
addition, other related factors cited include the participation pattern in the labour force, the level of
reservation wages, job search issues, and the impact of transfer payments. Bhorat and Leibbrandt
(1996), Bhorat and Oosthuizen (2005), and Banerjee, Galiani, Levinsohn and Woolard (2007) provide
a good overview.
A signi￿cant cause of unemployment in the past was the lack of economic growth during the
1970s, 1980s and 1990s (Fallon and Pereira da Silva, 1994; Lewis, 2001). Employment growth was
therefore low (Standing, Sender and Weeks, 1996; Bhorat, 2001). Recently, however, unemployment
has been high despite higher economic growth, suggesting that there are other underlying factors.
As South Africa liberalised and opened its economy to trade, production in agriculture and mining
declined and production shifted towards capital-intensive manufacturing and high-skilled services,
exacerbating the weak demand for less-skilled labour. See Edwards (2001) and Fedderke, Shin and
Vase (1999) among others for a more detailed discussion. A key factor in the economic transfor-
mation and structural change of the South African economy is the relative decline of the tradable
sectors, particularly the manufacturing sector but also agriculture and mining, where employment
is traditionally generated. The absolute number of jobs in the three sectors declined between 1994
and 2004. Employment fell by 12 percent in the agricultural sector, by 29 percent in the mining
sector, and by approximately 12 percent in the manufacturing sector. The non-tradable sectors such
as ￿nance and business services grew the most, but they are primarily skilled labour-intensive. See,
for example, Hausmann (2008) as well as Rodrik (2006).
Another signi￿cant factor is the rise in real wages, which directly dampens labour demand. This
rise is not a recent phenomenon and has persisted for several decades. The average growth of real
wages was about 1.3 percent per year in the 1980s and 1.5 percent per year in the 1990s. Lewis
(2001) estimates that real wages for unskilled and semi-skilled workers in particular have risen by
150% from 1970 to 1999. At the same time, unemployment among unskilled and semi-skilled workers
rose signi￿cantly from less than 10 percent in 1970 to over 50 percent in 1999. The evolution of real
wages is, however, subject to measurement and interpretation issues. Banerjee et al. (2007), for
example, measure employed hours worked in "e¢ ciency units" and ￿nd instead that "real wages per
unit of human capital" have increased only slightly from 1995 to 2005. On the other hand, labour
policy and minimum wage legislation since 1994, which were designed to correct the inequities and
disparity of the Apartheid era, have signi￿cantly increased the indirect non-wage labour cost.
The protection of labour has the indirect consequence of increasing labour market rigidities
2through reduced labour mobility, increased frictions to exits from employment, as well as the ad-
ditional cost of compliance to labour regulations and the negotiation processes with labour unions
￿see, for example, Nattrass (2000) and Moolman (2003). In addition to the implied wage premia
arising from unions and labour market institutions, it is plausible that the high concentration ratios
in the output markets noted by Fedderke, Kularatne and Mariotti (2006), Aghion, Bruan and Fed-
erkke (2006), and Hausmann (2008) limited competition and investment, thus reinforcing the slow
growth of employment in the formal sector. In a survey of 325 large South African manufacturing
￿rms, Chandra, Moorty, Rajaratman and Schaefer (2001) document the behavioural consequences
of the various labour market legislations ￿￿rms tend to hire fewer workers, substitute capital for
labour when expanding, employ temporary workers as opposed to hiring permanent workers, and
rely more on sub-contracting services.
There are also structural issues underlying the South African economy and labour markets.
A key manifestation of the structural problem is the complementarity or lack of substitution be-
tween skilled and unskilled workers, with the skills constraint dampening the employment growth
of less-skilled workers ￿see Hausmann (2008) and Levinsohn (2008). Signi￿cant factors include the
dualistic structure of the South African economy and the economic shifts towards more high-skilled
and capital-intensive economic activities. Implicit in the shift towards capital-intensive sectors and
their demand for skilled labour is the relative complementarity between capital and skilled labour,
which adds to the rigidities in the factor markets. Furthermore, Apartheid left South Africa with a
mismatch in the supply and demand of skills, as a generation of workers did not receive the bene￿t
of higher education. In this situation, equilibrium unemployment in the face of supply-side shocks
and shifts would tend to be higher, because the degree of coordination in wage-setting as well as
real wage in￿ exibility would lead to less e¢ cient supply-demand matching in South Africa (i.e., the
Beveridge curve approach to unemployment). Moreover, factors such as hysteresis and persistence
mechanisms, which were used to explain high unemployment in OECD countries, also point to the
likelihood that a sustained period of high unemployment caused by weak aggregate demand can in
turn cause a deterioration in the supply side of the economy, resulting in the long-term unemployed
being detached from the labour force and a higher equilibrium unemployment rate.2
The nonparticipation of the less-skilled who are jobless is a possible consequence of the structural
problems in South Africa. A vestige of Apartheid is the geographical distance between the residential
area of the unemployed and the location of ￿rms. As a result, transportation cost is a deterrent to
employment for less-skilled labour; in e⁄ect, it creates a high threshold in their reservation wage.
Various factors mitigate the necessity for immediate employment; these include income di⁄erences in
the dual economic structure combined with within-household income transfers due to the availability
of the old age pension or the employment of a family member in the formal sector. See, for example,
Banerjee et al. (2007), Poswell (2002), Dinkelman and Pirouz (2000) and Moll (1993).
1.2 Why a Wage Subsidy?
Because of these structural issues in South Africa￿ s labour market, policy intervention such as a
wage subsidy has become increasingly attractive. Using a careful empirical analysis of individual-
level changes and transitions in the labour market status observed from an extensive nationally
representative panel of individual labour data, Banerjee et al. (2007) conclude that, because of the
structural changes in the economy, South Africa￿ s high level of unemployment is an "equilibrium"
phenomenom; the decade-long high levels of unemployment appear to be a structural rather than
a temporary aberration. Such structural unemployment cannot be solved by macroeconomic man-
agement or temporary swings in aggregage demand, but must be addressed by policy interventions
a⁄ecting labour demand or supply such as wage subsidy, search subsidy, reduced regulations for ￿rst
jobs and government employment. Banerjee et al. also note that there is much more churning in the
2See, for example, Nickell et al. (2003). For a more general discussion, see Chapters 4 and 11 in Carlin and Soskice
(2006).
3South African labour market than would be observed under the conventional view that the market
is rigid. However, much of the churning may re￿ ect transitions or boundaries between searching and
non-searching that are more ￿ uid between being not economically active and informally employed
than between any of those states entering into formal employment. Part of the reason noted by
others is the small size of the informal sector, which does not provide a bu⁄er between formal jobs
and unemployment (Kingdon and Knight, 2000; Fallon and Lucas, 1998). Another factor is the
mismatch of skills noted above.
A basic justi￿cation for a wage subsidy is that it directly intervenes in the factor market to
stimulate demand for less-skilled labour. A wage subsidy creates jobs in the short-run, however,
in the long-run, less-skilled labour will be substituted for capital and skilled labour as less-skilled
labour becomes relatively cheaper. Like any relative price change, there will be substitution and
output/income e⁄ects from a wage subsidy, and the secondary or general equilibrium e⁄ects from
the interaction of various goods and factor markets in the economy may be important. In this study,
policy intervention occurs through factor demand for the less-skilled formal labour, with a wage
subsidy going directly to the producers. In this context, the substitution or complementarity of
labour types a⁄ects the employment-generating capacity of the wage subsidy.
Alternatively, the wage subsidy can be given directly to employees if the structural problems are
related to the supply of less-skilled labour. Thus, the supply of less-skilled labour is hampered by
a high reservation wage or ￿minimum" wage level that individuals are willing to accept in order to
work. Labour supply and "unemployment" of the less-skilled are therefore in equilibrium and the
measured high unemployment rates include the inactive (voluntary unemployment). In this context,
a subsidy to individuals would a⁄ect their reservation wage and induce a higher proportion of less-
skilled labour to participate in the labour market. This assumes, however, that factor demand,
factor input complementarity, and real wage ￿ exibility are not the major constraints in the labour
market in South Africa.3 In this study, the demand side will be the main area of investigation; we
leave issues such as the estimation of a reservation wage and the labour market participation of the
less-skilled worker for future research.
We also examine the sensitivity of the impact of a wage subsidy to two complementary policies
aimed at alleviating labour market problems in South Africa: i) increasing the supply of skilled
workers by removing restrictions on skilled immigrants or providing more training programmes; and
ii) facilitating the growth of economic activities (e.g., tradable sectors) where skill is less intensive.
Levisohn (2008) recommended a wage subsidy and an immigration reform to encourage the immigra-
tion of skilled individuals as two key policy responses to alleviate unemployment in South Africa. We
consider the worst case scenario, high complementarity between labour types, and examine whether
the marginal or net impact of the wage subsidy would be greater in combination with either policy
alternative.
Although this paper will not address design and implementation modalities of a wage subsidy in
detail, there are several key elements that are important: i) targeting; ii) lowering of labour cost;
iii) enhancement of the operation of the labour markets; and iv) ease of administration. Among
alternative schemes that are publicly debated, a voucher scheme appears promising. The vouchers
would go only to the unemployed or any subgroups being targeted such as new hires or entrants.
A voucher scheme should reduce labour costs since producers eventually get the subsidy as the
unemployed enter the market and seek jobs; it creates a missing market, enhancing interactions
between producers and those still unemployed. Producers are still able to choose among voucher
holders regarding who best ￿ts their hiring needs. A voucher system should be easy to administer
by making use of South Africa￿ s existing transfer system. In particular, Levinsohn (2008) outlines
what a well-targeted wage subsidy could constitute:
1. Since unemployment is highest among the young, a targeted wage subsidy could facilitate the
3In addition, it will entail a very di⁄erent labour market closure in that wages have to be ￿exible with labor supply
responding to the changes in the market wage and its distance to the reservation wage of workers.
4school-to-work transition, targeting recent school leavers. It should be available to all South
Africans after the age of 18 or as soon as they have completed schooling (to minimise the
number of students that would leave school for a subsidised job). The subsidy would not
expire to ensure that those who stay in school after the age of 18 are not penalised.
2. Upon turning 18, each South African receives an account ("Subsidy Account") into which
Government places a sum of money (each person receives exactly the same amount of money).
This money can only be used to subsidise the monthly wage that the individual receives while
working for a registered ￿rm. When the individual takes a job in the formal sector (in a
registered ￿rm), a fraction of the individual￿ s wage would be drawn from the individual￿ s
Subsidy Account. The subsidy would be entirely portable and tied to the individual, not the
￿rm.
3. A critical component of the targeted wage subsidy is a probationary period during which
subsidised workers may be dismissed at will. The period should allow the employer enough
time to learn whether the employee is job-worthy but shorter than the total duration of the
subsidy to ensure that workers can ￿nd an alternative job if the ￿rst one does not work.
Relative to various suggestions regarding a wage subsidy like Levinsohn (2008), this paper is
therefore complementary in attempting to quantify the likely employment e⁄ects of a wage subsidy.
1.3 The Approach of the Paper
To look at the employment e⁄ects of a wage subsidy, the distinguishing feature of the analysis is
a disaggregative framework, which combines a multi-sector and multi-labour Computable General
Equilibrium (CGE) model with a micro simulation model of South Africa along the line of work
such as Bourguignon, Robilliard, and Robinson (2002), Savard (2006, 2003) and Essama-Nssah, Go,
Kearney, Korman, Robinson, and Thierfelder (2007). Speci￿cally, we use this framework to assess the
likely impact of a wage subsidy on unemployment and its sensitivity to the relative complementarity
or lack of substitution among factors of production and to the labour market conditions in South
Africa. The paper examines several issues:
1. Under what circumstances will a wage subsidy be e⁄ective or ine⁄ective in reducing unem-
ployment, particularly in the labour categories of unskilled or semi-skilled workers where un-
employment is concentrated?
2. How signi￿cant are the welfare and equity impacts on heterogenous households and on partic-
ular groups of labour and households?
3. What are the ￿scal and economy-wide repercussions?
4. In a worst case scenario, can the employment e⁄ects of a wage subsidy be enhanced with other
supporting measures such as an increase in the supply of skilled labour or an increase in output
of low-skill labour-intensive sectors?
Relative to a recent CGE application of the wage subsidy issue in South Africa in Pauw and
Edwards (2006), the present analysis contributes the following additional features:
1. Cross substitution among labour categories is di⁄erentiated using a translog (instead of a tra-
ditional nested CES) formulation, which will allow for di⁄erent degrees of complementarity
between higher skilled and lower skilled labour in various sectors, closer but di⁄erent sub-
stitution among lower skilled labour in di⁄erent sectors, and greater but di⁄erent degrees of
complementarity between high-skilled labour and capital in various sectors.
52. The addition of the micro-simulation model also allows for the welfare and equity analysis of a
policy reform with the full heterogeneous information contained in the household and labour
force surveys.
3. The combination of the wage subsidy and complementary policies. To deal with parameter
uncertainty due to the lack of reliable empirical estimates of the elasticity of substitution
among factors of production, we evaluate the impact of wage subsidy over alternative sets of
low, medium, and high elasticities. The CGE cum micro-simulation framework has the wage
earnings equations and multi-nomial logit functions of occupational choices from the micro
data linked to the CGE model like Bourguignon, Robilliard, and Robinson (2002). The link
and reconciliation between the two models is essentially a recursive top-down iteration similar
to Savard (2006, 2003) and Essama-Nssah et al., (2007).4
The model is used as a "measuring instrument" rather than a forecasting or planning model. By
abstracting from other policy issues or the temporal aspects of South Africa￿ s recent growth (e.g.,
terms of trade shocks, investment growth, etc.), it holds everything else constant and focuses on
measurement of the marginal employment e⁄ects of a wage subsidy and the sensitivity to alternative
degrees of labour market ￿ exibility and to some supporting measures suggested to alleviate the
labour market problems. The model does not address the design and implementation elements of a
wage subsidy.
1.4 The Structure of the Paper
The paper is structured as follows: section 2 provides an overview of the economic framework, a
CGE cum micro-simulation model, with emphasis on its distinctive aspects and structural features
imposed to portray the South African economy and its labour market situation; section 3 discusses
the simulations and the results; and section 4 draws general conclusions and makes recommendations
for further research.
2 The Economic Framework and its Application to South
Africa
The economic framework is an extension of the CGE cum micro-simulation model in Essama-Nssah
et al., (2007). The top layer is a CGE model for South Africa with data for 2003, using the modeling
approach described in Lofgren, Harris, and Robinson (2001). See Kearney (2004) for a detailed
description of the model features. The bottom layer is a micro-simulation described in Korman
(2006), which pulls together the micro observations of the Labour Force Survey (LFS: 2000) and
Income and Expenditure surveys (IES: 2000).5 We focus on the features relevant for analysis of the
economy, labour market, degrees of complementarity among labour types and capital, closure rules,
and the micro behaviour of labour and households.
4A bottom-up iteration is possible but not employed in the present study. A two-way iteration is best used if there
are dynamic feedbacks from factor accumulation as well as changes in the demand structure, which are planned for
future applications.
5These surveys are nationally representative and conducted by Statistics South Africa. Both surveys are mostly
based on the same sample of households, therefore we combined data from these two surveys using individual￿ s unique
identi￿cation code.
62.1 Economic Structure of the South Africa
The CGE model has 43 production activities.6 For reporting purposes, the output results by ac-
tivity are aggregated into three categories: agriculture, industry, and services (see table 1 for the
composition of the aggregate categories). 7
[Insert Table 1 about here]
Agriculture accounts for 4 percent of value added, industry accounts for 27 percent, and service
accounts for 69 percent (Figure 1).
[Insert Figure 1 about here]
2.2 Labour in South Africa
There are three types of labour (formal, self-employed, and informal) and three skill levels (high-
skilled, semi-skilled, and low-skilled) within each type of labour. Value added is allocated to primary
factors, and summarised in Table 2.
[Insert Table 2 about here]
Table 3 shows the distribution of employment by sector and occupation. About 6 people out of
ten are employed in the services sector. About the same ratio are engaged in formal sector work.
With respect to the distribution of skills, the data show that about 12 percent of those employed
are highly skilled; over 45 percent of labour in South Africa is employed in the low-skilled and
medium-skilled formal sector and another 19 percent in the informal sector.
[Insert Table 3 about here]
Self-employed and informal sector workers make up about 43 percent of the total employed
labour force. A large proportion of informal labour (including domestic workers) and self-employed
are working in the services sector, which is the biggest employer of the workforce and also employs
the largest share of the high-skilled workers.
Since the wage subsidy is given to employers of formal wage workers, we describe brie￿ y the
characteristics of the formal labour market from the LFS (2000) and IES (2000) surveys. Figure 2
shows formal employment by skill level. High-skilled formal workers8 constitute 24 percent of the
total formal work force. Semi-skilled workers9 constitute 55 percent of the total formal employment
and low-skilled workers that are de￿ned as elementary occupations10 constitute about 21 percent of
the formal wage labour market. Overall, about 72 percent of formal employment is characterised by
either low- or semi-skilled workers.
[Insert Figure 2 about here]
Formal wage workers in agricultural and retail trade sectors are relatively poor. Based on income
thresholds from a recent study on South Africa (Altman, 2007), formal workers can be classi￿ed into
three groups: i) very poor, ii) working poor, and iii) not poor. The working poor refers to anyone
who is employed by the de￿nition of the South African Labour force survey (also in line with
the International Labour Organisation (ILO) de￿nition), working and earning less than R2,500 per
month.This threshold is close to that chosen by National Treasury as the minimum level below which
workers are exempt from income tax.11 Table 4 re￿ ects only formal employment by economic sectors.
Agricultural and trade sectors hold the largest share of very poor or poor workers. Manufacturing
6Full detail of the South African CGE model can be found in Essama et al. (2007) and Kearney (2004); for a
version of the model used to analyse Value Added Taxes (VAT), see Go et al. (2005). In this description, we comment
on new features of the model important for an analysis of a wage subsidy.
7Note, we disaggregate crude oil from other mining, as described in Essama et al. (2007).
8High skilled formal workers include legislators, senior o¢ cials, professionals, technical and associate professionals.
9Semi skilled workers are: clerks, service workers and shop and market sales workers, skilled agricultural and ￿shery
workers, craft and related trades workers, plant and machine operators and assemblers.
10Low-skilled workers include elementary jobs.
11The minimum level of annual income subject to income tax was R32,000 in 2004. We converted this value in 2000
prices using CPI to make it comparable to our study. In 2000 prices, the minimum annual income would be about
R25, 848.
7sectors also have relatively large shares of working poor formal workers (18 percent). On the other
hand, non-poor workers are mainly employed in services although manufacturing and ￿nancial sectors
also have signi￿cant shares of non-poor workers, with 19 and 14 percent respectively.
Evidence con￿rms that low-skilled, low-wage, individuals are trapped in poverty. About 85
percent of low-skilled workers in the formal economy are either very poor or working poor (Figure
3). On the other hand, almost 85 percent of people with high-skill levels are non-poor. Skill level is
an important determinant of poverty within the working population.
[Insert Figure 3 about here]
To explore further the link between skill level and poverty, Table 5 reports three types of earn-
ings by di⁄erent level of education. For all three types of workers, earnings increase sharply with
education, an attribute closely linked with skill level. For example, a worker with a university degree
in the formal sector earns, on average, about 8 times as much as a worker with no schooling. The
disparity between a degree-holder and a worker with no schooling is even larger in the informal
sector or the self-employed sector.
[Insert Table 5 about here]
As the education level rises, average annual earnings also rise. On average, individuals with
higher education earn more than twice that of individuals who have graduated from grades 10-12.
When compared with di⁄erent types of labour, self-employed with higher education earn the most
compared to the formal and informal labour with the same level of education. On the other hand,
at lower levels of education, formal workers earn more until grade 12. There are other dimensions
of earning disparity among formal sector workers. Two most commonly discussed aspects are:
rural/urban disparity and disparity based on gender. For instance, average earnings are signi￿cantly
higher for those who are working in urban areas. The di⁄erential is largest for the self-employed
(see Table 6).
[Insert Table 6 about here]
The data show signi￿cant gender di⁄erences in average earnings (Figure 4). Di⁄erentials are
three times more prominent in the self-employed group than in other labour types. Male workers
earn, on average, about 60 percent more than female workers in informal labour. Wage di⁄erentials
are smallest for formal wage workers, where male workers earn, on average, about 20 percent more
than female workers. Although income di⁄erences due to gender or education are not distinguished
explicitly in the CGE model, they are captured in the earnings or wage functions of the micro-
simulation.
[Insert Figure 4 about here]
2.3 Relative Complementarity or Low Substitution among Factors of
Production
Relative complementarity or low substitution among factors of production is a key assumption in
the model. Each economic activity can use nine labour categories plus capital in production. For
reporting purposes, all skill levels of the self-employed are aggregated into a single input, self-
employed labour; likewise for informal labour. In the production technology, it is assumed that
substitution possibilities among inputs di⁄er and the following structure is used: (E1) it is di¢ cult
to substitute low-skilled labour for high-skilled labour in any of the three labour categories; (E2)
it is easy to substitute across labour categories for the same skill (i.e., a high-skilled formal worker
is a good substitute for a high-skilled informal worker or a high-skilled self-employed worker); and
(E3) as the skill level of labour increases, it is more di¢ cult to substitute capital for labour. In the
CGE model, this behaviour is represented using a translog production function.12 The degree of
12All activities except coal, gold, other mining, and re￿ned petroleum use a translog production function; coal,
gold, other mining, and re￿ned petroleum use a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) production function with
the assumption that it is di¢ cult to substitute among inputs so the elasticity of substitution is low (0.2).
8substitution among labour inputs in production is important when measuring what impact a wage
subsidy for low and medium-skilled formal workers will have on unemployment.
Input substitution possibilities vary by production activity. A set of multipliers (Table 7) are
applied to all sectors, providing similar "structure"or "nesting"of elasticities, however, sectors have
di⁄erent reference elasticities (Table 8). Given the lack of empirical estimates regarding the exact
magnitudes of factor substitution, we provide sensitivity tests and consider three cases - low sub-
stitution elasticities, base substitution elasticities, and high substitution elasticities. In the base
case, the reference elasticities of substitution in Table 8 are multiplied directly by the factors in
Table 7. The resulting base case numbers correspond generally to conservative numbers found in
various CGE works, including Essama-Nssah et al., (2007) and Kearney (2004). Low substitution
elasticity values are one half those reported in Table 7, high substitution elasticity values are two
times those reported in Table 7. When the production process is assumed to be constant elasticity
of substitution (CES), the values in Table 8 are used.
[Insert Table 7 about here]
[Insert Table 8 about here]
2.4 Macroeconomic Closures
At the macro-level, we assume that government￿ s real spending, real investment, and aggregate
foreign savings are constant. Private savings adjust in order to maintain a ￿xed total investment
in the economy and all changes a⁄ect household consumption. This is a standard approach in
public ￿nance analysis of revenue and welfare issues as it provides the results of the wage subsidy
in isolation of other macroeconomic adjustment shocks, e.g., from any changes in investment or
government expenditure.13 Domestic savings (savings by institutions or households) are assumed to
adjust and the economic and welfare e⁄ects are driven primarily by changes in net household income
and consumption as the cost of higher wage subsidies ￿lter through the economy.
Unlike traditional tax models, however, there will be a resource e⁄ect as the subsidy will lower
wage cost and raise employment given the labour market behaviour of the model. The structural
features of the labour markets in South Africa are treated in a similar fashion as in Essama et
al. (2007), Go et al. (2005) and Lewis (2001). Structural unemployment is speci￿ed for low-
skilled and semi-skilled formal workers, with sticky real wages, while the other labour markets
clear in equilibrium. All other factors are mobile across all production activities and are fully
employed, with the exception of capital in agriculture, coal, gold, and other mining which are
treated as activity speci￿c.14 The wage subsidy is introduced much like a "negative wage tax"
that lowers the labour cost to employers; it a⁄ects only the low-skilled and semi-skilled workers
where signi￿cant unemployment exists, but covers employers in all activities except coal, gold, other
minerals, petroleum, and government services. Although there are already great details in terms of
sectors and labour categories, the CGE model cannot further target the wage subsidy to the young or
new job entrants, as for example formulated by Levinsohn (2008), without the additional complexity
of adding a demographic component to labour market behaviour. Likewise, at the micro-simulation
level explained below, an increase in employment is drawn from the pool of unemployed among
the low- and semi-skilled based primarily on their economic and individual characteristics (such as
education, experience, gender, etc.) that a⁄ect their probabilities of being hired. The incorporation
of demographic dynamics is clearly an area for future research.
In the government budget, government savings are ￿ ￿ exible￿ , but with investment and government
spending ￿xed, this is just a modeling device to shift the adjustment to the households. It is in fact
13The crowding out of private investment is therefore not the focus. The other option of adjusting government
expenditure in the budget, while feasible, is constrained by the indirect links between public services and household
income/consumption/welfare. To examine the impact on household income and welfare, those links will need to be
spelled out.
14With this speci￿cation, we present a long-run view of the adjustment process, achieving equilibrium sectoral
employment except those sectors in which capital is assumed to be sector-speci￿c.
9equivalent to the imposition of a lump-sum tax on household income. The wage subsidy is therefore
not free and the ￿scal cost will depend on the interaction among the resource e⁄ects of increased
employment and Gross Domestic Product (GDP), the dampening e⁄ects on household income from
the implied lump-sum tax, and their economy-wide e⁄ects on the revenue of existing taxes. One
advantage of a general equilibrium approach is that all the economy-wide or direct and indirect
e⁄ects are observed. Since tax revenue from other sources will likely adjust upward, the net cost
of the programme is not the full expenditure on wage subsidies. What is not ￿nanced from the
revenue e⁄ect of existing taxes is the net ￿scal cost; it is also the size of the implied lump-sum tax
on households. Because the ￿rst best option of lump-sum taxation is normally not feasible, we also
look at a real or existing tax instrument like the social security tax and examine the implications
for changes in household income taxes following a wage subsidy as well as possible distributional
impacts.
2.5 Micro-behaviour of Labour and Households
A micro-simulation model is used to explain the income generation processes and the expenditure
patterns at the household-level based on parameterisation of the information contained in the house-
hold survey data. The LFS provides detailed information on labour supply, employment, unemploy-
ment, formal wages, informal wages, and self-employed income, and a number of socio-economic
characteristics of individuals and households. The IES survey contains detailed data on household
expenditure patterns, labour and non-labour incomes of household, and a number of socio-economic
characteristics of households. When the two databases are combined and observations with missing
sampling weights are dropped, the number of individuals in our database is 103,732 from 26,214
households. We rely on household weights from the IES data to generate economy-wide results.
The speci￿cation of our model of the income-generation process at the individual- or household-
level is described in more details in Essama et al. (2007) and Korman (2006). The model has three
components: (a) a multinomial logit model of the allocation of individuals across occupational states,
based on individual and labour characteristics; (b) a model of the determinants of earnings (such as
education, gender, union membership, urban-rural location, head of household, marital status, etc.);
and (c) an aggregation rule for computing household income from the contribution of its employed
members. We assume that other types of non-labour income, such as interest and rent incomes
or transfers, are exogenous. The sum of formal and informal wages and self-employment income
by all wage earners and self-employed people in a household and other non-labour income make
up total household income. The econometric modeling of the income-generation processes includes
the estimation of wage functions and occupational probability functions for formal labour, informal
labour, and self-employed workers by skill-type and by economic sectors (see also the annexure for
details).
2.6 Macro-Micro Links
The communication between the CGE model and the micro-simulation model is a top-down ap-
proach. The CGE model translates the impact of the shocks and policies through changes in rel-
ative prices of commodities and factors, and through levels of employment. The micro-simulation
model takes these changes as exogenous and translates them into changes in household behaviour
which underpins changes in earnings, occupational status, and gains and losses of per capita income
as indicative measures of welfare. A series of steps are taken to ensure outcomes from the micro-
simulation model are consistent with the aggregate results from the CGE model both before and
after the shock. In particular, the consistency constraints require that the occupational choices pre-
dicted by the micro-simulation model match the employment shares in the CGE model. Similarly,
10simulated earnings at the micro level must match macro predictions.15 Because the base years for
the Social Accounting Matrix (SAM, 2003) and the survey data (2000) in our study of South Africa
are di⁄erent, we employ percent changes to communicate changes in employment, wages, and prices
from the CGE to the micro simulation. This allows us to retain the more recent numbers in the
macro accounts as well as the familiar poverty and inequality measurements of the micro data.16
In the case of employment changes, the CGE model provides estimates of the percent change in
employment by category for each simulation. The micro simulation model generates exactly the same
percent changes in the individual labour force data set by moving individuals into (or out of) that
speci￿c labour category. For example, when a labour category expands, the micro simulation model
uses unemployed individual￿ s estimated maximum utilities (i.e, summation of predicted probabilities
plus the error or unobservable term) of being in each employment category (including the unemployed
group). When moving individuals from the unemployed pool to the employed group, we used the
following information about unemployed people: (i) their skill type, and (ii) the economic sector in
which they were previously employed before they became unemployed. This information is utilised
in the process of moving individuals into the labour market.
3 Simulations
The employment impact of a wage subsidy to low and medium-skilled formal labour largely depends
on two sets of factors: i) the relative complementarity of the factors of production; and ii) labour
market constraints due to either a limited amount of skilled labour and capital or the size of the
unskilled and medium-skilled intensive sectors in the economy. We devise two sets of simulations to
test the sensitivity of a wage subsidy to key factors. We also look at the microeconomic impact of
a wage subsidy on households assuming the middle range of substitution elasticities in production.
3.1 Set 1 of Simulations: Sensitivity of the Impact of Wage Subsidy to
the Relative Complementarity of the Factors of Production
The magnitude of the employment gains from a wage subsidy depends upon the assumptions about
factor substitution in production. Three scenarios assuming low, medium, and high elasticities of
substitution between factors of production are performed to illustrate the employment creating po-
tential of a wage subsidy. In the presence of technological constraints and labour market rigidities,
the elasticities of substitution would be rather low￿ as may be the case in South Africa. As tech-
nology improves and/or labour market rigidities are removed, the elasticities of substitution should
increase and the employment creating potential of a wage subsidy would be larger.
We consider a range of values for a wage subsidy to all production activities except coal, gold,
other mining, re￿ned petroleum, and government services. As seen in Table 9, for a 10 percent wage
subsidy, the employment gains range from 1.9 percent when the economy is assumed to be in￿ exible
in production to 7.2 percent when the economy is assumed to be ￿ exible in production. The wage
subsidy expands employment of low and medium-skilled formal labour in all three sectors. The
agricultural sector shows a large percentage increase in employment, but given the sector￿ s relatively
small share in total employment, the contribution to the change in total employment is relatively low.
The agricultural sector￿ s employment creation potential rises rapidly as the elasticities of substitution
rise (for example employment of low-skilled formal labour increases from 5.1 percent to 21.2 percent).
Further research is needed on the agricultural sector to assess its true employment potential, given
the seasonality of the sector￿ s employment as well as the existing institutional rigidities such as land
15Bourguignon, Robilliard and Robinson (2002) explain that benchmark consistency could be achieved by ensuring
that the calibration of the CGE is compatible with the consistency constraints.
16See Essama et al. (2007) for details. Savard (2006) and Robillard and Robinson (2006) also discussed approaches
for achieving consistency between household survey data and the national accounts.
11reform and minimum wages. The factors in ￿xed total supply (high-skilled formal labour, informal
labour, and self-employed labour) are released from the services sector as the economy adjusts to
the wage subsidy.
[Insert Table 9 about here]
Increased employment from the wage subsidy leads to increased GDP. For a 10 percent wage sub-
sidy, GDP increases from 0.6 percent (low substitution elasticities) to 2.4 percent (high substitution
elasticities), see Table 10.
[Insert Table 10 about here]
The modeling results estimate that a 10 percent wage subsidy with low elasticities of substitution
will cost R19.7 billion (in 2003 rand, see Table 11). However, real GDP increases as employment
increases, and tax revenues will also increase, o⁄setting the cost of the wage subsidy. As a result,
the e⁄ective cost of the wage subsidy is 75 percent of the total wage subsidy bill, in the low elasticity
case. If one assumes the economy is more ￿ exible, the e⁄ective net cost of the wage subsidy falls to
55 percent of the wage subsidy bill. The wage subsidy per job created is relatively high, at R90,758
per job created for the low elasticity case, because the wage subsidy is provided to all low-skilled
formal and medium-skilled formal labour hired, not just to the additional workers. The cost per job
created declines dramatically as the economy becomes more ￿ exible.
[Insert Table 11 about here]
The employment and GDP e⁄ects increase as the subsidy rate increases. Here we report the
changes for the base case. As seen in Figure 5, total employment growth ranges from 1.8 percent
for a 5 percent wage subsidy to 11 percent for a 25 percent wage subsidy. GDP growth ranges from
0.6 to 3.3 percent.
The current model speci￿cation assumes that the wage subsidy only a⁄ects the number employed
without a⁄ecting the market wages. Alternatively, the presence of labour unions means that some of
the wage subsidy is collected by union workers in the form of higher wages. To show the sensitivity
of our results to union behaviour, we consider the case in which the union claims half of the wage
subsidy in the form of higher wages. Using the medium elasticity values and a 10 percent wage
subsidy, we ￿nd that the employment gains are 1.7 percent, compared to 3.8 percent in the absence
of unions￿ the employment gains are more than twice as large in the absence of increased wages.
[Insert Figure 5 about here]
Replacing the implied lump-sum tax with a real tax, we impose a social security tax to ￿nance
about two-thirds of the wage subsidy cost. It this scenario, the social security tax (sst) pushes
the cost of the programme to a subset of household income groups￿ it is imposed on income groups
earning R24,000 and R100,000 to partially ￿nance the wage subsidy. These households are primarily
from income deciles 7 to 9. Lower household deciles do not fall in the tax base and are therefore
excluded, while the uppermost household deciles are not considered because the incomes are mainly
non-wage. The social security tax is implemented as a direct tax with no incentive e⁄ects on the
employer; it e⁄ectively replaces the implied lump-sum tax necessary to ￿nance the wage subsidy.
The direct income tax rate, including the social security tax, goes from 0.087 to 0.117 for the seventh
income decile group, 0.108 to 0.146 for the eighth income decile group, and 0.136 to 0.182 for the
ninth income decile group. Other direct taxes are raised further to ￿nance the rest of the wage
subsidy cost, but do not have to increase as much as would be the case without the social security
tax. The impact of the ￿nancing scheme is evident when looking at household welfare ￿ there is a
dramatic decline in the net gains income for the households paying the social security tax. Next, we
look at the more detailed impact on households for the medium case of the elasticities of substitution.
3.1.1 Impact on Households ￿Medium Elasticity Case
Looking at the medium case in Table 9, a wage subsidy to the formal sector employers leads to an
increase in employment in the formal sector, particularly in the agricultural sector. The importance
of wage subsidy policy is to create new jobs for low-skill and medium-skill formal unemployed
12individuals in the labour force while encouraging employers to hire new employees with these skill
groups and reducing their wage bill. As a result, employment increases by 3 percent and the new
workers are making non-zero wages. While there are di⁄erences in earnings of newly employed
workers depending on their age, racial composition, and regional disparities, they are bene￿ciaries
of the subsidy scheme since they start making non-zero earnings, are out of the unemployed pool,
and, as a result their welfare increases.
Although a wage subsidy is primarily focused on increasing jobs, the average wage may be a⁄ected
by the wages of new entrants, depending on their level of experience, education, etc. For low- and
medium-skill workers in the industrial sector, new entrants are drawn primarily from unemployed,
young, black Africans, who tend to have less work experience and less education than a university
degree. As a result, there is a decline in the average wage because new entrants earn much lower than
average wages (Figure 6). Regardless of skill level, workers in agriculture gain from implementation
of a 10 percent ad-volerem wage subsidy policy. Average wage gains vary from 2.3 percent for low-
skill workers to 3.3 percent increase for high-skill workers in the agricultural sector. On the other
hand, for low- and medium-skill workers in the service sector, average wage increases are negligible,
while high-skill workers gain above 2 percent in the same sector (Figure 6).17
[Insert Figure 6 about here]
Overall aggregate income gains for formal sector workers are still substantial, ranging from 0.6%
to 11%, particularly for those in the agricultural and service sectors (Figure 7). The total income
gains re￿ ect both changes in employment and changes in average wages.
[Insert Figure 7 about here]
We also examine the impact of a social security tax imposed on households with income between
R24 000 and R100 000 to partially ￿nance the wage subsidy with the proceeds. The households
subject to the new tax are in high income deciles (mainly the top 3 deciles - except the richest
decile where the primary income sources are non-wage). As the social security tax is not likely to
a⁄ect employers￿behaviour, there is little impact on the employment level and the structure of the
economy from the macro results. As expected, however, there are di⁄erences at the household level.
Households are generally better o⁄ and their welfare increases with a wage subsidy with or
without a social security tax (Figure 8). Relative to the baseline, the imposition of a social security
tax a⁄ects mainly those households subjected to the new tax - the upper income deciles (7, 8,9
deciles). Income gains by household income group range from 2% (for the richest group) to 20% (for
the poorest). But with a social security tax imposed on the top 3 deciles (excluding the richest), the
gains will likely disappear for households in these higher 3 income deciles. For example, households
in the ninth decile become net losers from the imposition of social security tax.
[Insert Figure 8 about here]
3.1.2 Overall Poverty and Inequality Decline
Tables 12 and 13 report the Foster-Greer-Thorbecke (FGT) poverty headcount ratio and general
entropy indices with particular focus on the Gini Coe¢ cient. About 1.6 percent of households move
out of poverty with the implementation of the wage subsidy, with the head count ratio declining
from 49.1 to 47.6 percent.18 The employment e⁄ect also o⁄sets the addition of a social security tax
with a 1.5 percent reduction in the poverty rate.
In addition to overall poverty, rural poverty also decreases about 1.5 percent from 72.1 per-
cent to 70.6 percent; urban poverty declines 1.6 percent. Poorer households gain more than richer
households. The decomposition of headcount poverty ratio by population deciles shows that poorer
households, on average, gain more than richer households (see Table 12). For instance, the poverty
rate falls on average by more than 2 percentage points for lower deciles of the population. Other
17In the CGE model, the average real wage for low- and medium- skilled formal labor type is ￿xed economy-wide,
but wage di⁄erences exist by activities.
18These results are based on using $1 as a poverty line per day per person.
13potential winners in terms of poverty levels include ￿i) households with heads completing an edu-
cation level of grade 7-9; individuals with technical and vocational school degrees; iii) higher skilled
workers. Overall, the di⁄erences in poverty rates between the two simulations are very minimal.
[Insert Table 12 about here]
[Insert Table 13 about here]
All inequality indicators improve (Table 13). The Gini Coe¢ cient declines about half a percent-
age point from 72 to 71.5 percent. A similar decline is also observed at the regional level. The
magnitudes of these changes are similar in both simulations. While we observe variations from the
base case in both simulations, the di⁄erences are not signi￿cant.
3.2 Set 2 of Simulations: Sensitivity of the Employment E⁄ects of a
Wage Subsidy to Measures That Ease the Skill Constraint or Promote
Labor Intensive Activities, Assuming Low Elasticity of Substitution
among Factors of Production
The positive impact of the wage subsidy on employment, poverty, and inequality hinges on a critical
assumption ￿ that the elasticities of substitution among factors of production are those of the
medium case. In the low case, the impact will likely be minimal (see employment e⁄ects in Table
9, for example). Lowering the cost of less-skilled labour to employers with a wage subsidy will
not generate an employment kick when factors of production are relatively complementary and the
constraint is the supply of skilled workers (or capital). Given some uncertainty regarding the degree
of labour market rigidity, we consider further sensitivity tests for the low elasticity scenario. In
particular, we consider the e⁄ect of a wage subsidy given: (i) a 5% increase in the supply of skilled
labour; (ii) a 5% increase in the supply of skilled labour and capital; (iii) a 5% increase in the supply
of skilled labour and capital and a 10% production subsidy to activities with high value added shares
in low-skilled and medium-skilled labour; and (iv) for each of the three interventions from (i) to (iii),
a marginal increase in the low substitution elasticities among factor inputs.
Introducing the measures above also addresses, in a partial or simpli￿ed way, some of the second-
best e⁄ects of a wage subsidy￿ a wage subsidy essentially introduces a distortion to o⁄set other
distortions that have resulted in high unemployment of low-skilled and medium-skilled labour in
South Africa. A wage subsidy can be viewed as a short-term solution, while the increase in the
availability of skilled labour and capital and the increased substitution possibility among factor
inputs addresses the longer term adjustments. By design, however, the accumulation of skills and
capital as well as changes in the substitution elasticities in the simulations are limited to what may
be easily attained in the short-term in order to test the sensitivity of the wage subsidy to these
factors and examine any interesting interactions.
3.2.1 Policy Intervention I
Under the original low elasticity case (Set A in Table 14), the constraint that there are too few
skilled workers is relaxed and the supply is increased by 5 percent. The amount of change or
actual measures for bringing this about are not the focus, but the measures could range from the
removal of restrictions on skilled immigrants in the short-term or through training programmes in
the longer run. For simplicity, we assume that existing public expenditures or training programmes
can be realigned to bring this about without additional ￿scal cost. The employment impacts of
a 10 percent wage subsidy, summarised in Table 14, are indeed positive. However, looking at the
marginal employment e⁄ects of the wage subsidy given the policy intervention (column iv) and
comparing them with the reference case of a wage subsidy alone (without the policy intervention),
the employment gains (column v) are negligible ￿very slightly positive for medium-skilled labour
and slightly negative for low-skilled labour. This is likely due to the fact that skilled workers are
also highly complementary to capital, which is kept constant.
14The low elasticity case, which is half the multipliers of Table 7 times the reference elasticities of
Table 8, is close to a Leontief ￿xed-coe¢ cient technology in some activities. The implicit substitution
elasticities, for example, between high-skilled and low-skilled workers and between capital and high-
skilled workers in mining, metal products, machinery, vehicles and transport equipment, etc., are
close to 0.12 ￿a high degree of complementarity among these factors or a fairly rigid factor market.
3.2.2 Policy Intervention II
Policy intervention II involves policy intervention I plus 5 percent growth in capital. This mimics
the increase in productive capacity in the economy through capital accumulation or productivity
change. Relaxing the capital constraint in addition to skills will bring about a higher marginal
employment of a wage subsidy and the employment gains relative to the reference case are clearly
positive.
3.2.3 Policy Intervention III
This involves policy intervention II plus a 10 percent production subsidy to production activities
with high value added shares to low- and medium-skilled formal labour. The output subsidy, in
e⁄ect, redirects the increase in capital towards more labour-intensive sectors. The targeted sectors
are the ones with 40 percent of value added to either low-skilled formal labour or medium-skilled
formal labour, except gold which does not get a wage subsidy. They are: textiles, apparel, wood
and wood products, printing, publishing, and recorded media, rubber products, plastic products,
machinery and equipment, other transport equipment, furniture, and other producers.
The results are in line with the expected outcomes, in most cases. The marginal employment
gains relative to the reference case improve with additional policy interventions (and note the policy
interventions are cumulative). The only two exceptions are in the low elasticity case. The marginal
e⁄ect of a wage subsidy on employment, given a 5 percent increase in skilled labour (intervention
I) is not better than the e⁄ect of a wage subsidy alone￿ employment for low-skilled labour does
increase by 3.3 percent when there is a wage subsidy in addition to the expansion of the supply of
skilled labour. However, this is slightly below the employment gains of a wage subsidy alone. In the
model, skilled labour and low-skilled labour are poor substitutes in production (see Table 7). When
it is di¢ cult to substitute skilled labour for low-skilled labour, the employment response to a wage
subsidy is not as great when there is an additional supply of skilled labour. When the labour market
is less rigid (Set B), the wage subsidy has a bigger marginal e⁄ect on the employment of low-skilled
labour given an increased supply of skilled labour.
A similar situation arises for medium-skilled labour in policy intervention III for low produc-
tion substitutability (Set A). In this case, the question is, ￿why is the marginal e⁄ect of a wage
subsidy smaller in the case of policy intervention III compared to policy intervention II?" Since
policy intervention III is policy intervention, II plus a production subsidy to low and medium-skilled
formal labour, one would expect that the marginal employment gains would be highest with policy
intervention III. As seen in Table 7, it is di¢ cult to substitute medium-skilled formal labour and
capital; as a result, the employment response to a production subsidy to medium-skilled intensive
sectors is dampened. When it is easier to substitute medium-skilled formal labour and capital, as
is the case in Set B, the results show that the marginal employment e⁄ects of a wage subsidy for
medium-skilled labour are higher as policy interventions expand. This is not the case for low-skilled
formal labour; it is easier to substitute capital for low-skilled labour and the marginal e⁄ects of a
wage subsidy are higher in policy intervention III than policy intervention II.
3.2.4 Improving Labor Market Flexibility at the Margins (Set B)
For each supporting measure, we also examine the sensitivity of the impact of the wage subsidy
under a slight improvement in the labour market ￿ exibility by somewhat reducing the degree of
15complementarity among factors of production. We do not consider how this may be brought about
but suggestions by many include reduction of regulations for new job entrants and for government
employment.
More speci￿cally, Set B in Table 14 provides a slightly higher low elasticity case with elastic-
ities computed as 0.75 times the reference values instead of 0.50 times the reference values. The
results now show that the marginal employment e⁄ects of a wage subsidy are all higher. The em-
ployment gains relative to the reference case are also now clearly higher for the increase in skills or
other measures. The employment gains of a production subsidy over intervention II are also now
established.
Labour market ￿ exibility matters a great deal in determining the employment impact of a wage
subsidy, especially in the lower elasticity range. Moreover, for the two sets of lower values of the
elasticity of substitution between high-skilled and low-skilled labour and between high-skilled labour
and capital, the improvement ranges of 0.1-0.2 to 0.2-0.3 at the lowest end and from 0.2-0.3 to 0.3-0.4
in the next level - all still below 0.50 or the Cobb-Douglas case of 1.0. The increase in labour market
￿ exibility being considered in Set B is very modest.
[Insert Table 14 about here]
4 Conclusions
The impact of a wage subsidy on unemployment very much depends on the elasticities of substitution
of factors of production and on the structural characteristics of the labour market. In the medium
elasticity case, a wage subsidy will have the intended impact on employment of low and semi-skilled
formal labour and will generate improvements in terms of poverty and inequality. Depending on
the elasticities, we ￿nd that overall employment gains range from 1.9 to 7.2 percent. Although a
wage subsidy to employers is expensive per job created, because the subsidy goes to all low- and
medium-skilled formal labour, the expansion of the labour supply will increase GDP and generate
some o⁄setting tax revenue from existing tax instruments, particularly in the medium and high
elasticity cases. The net cost may be ￿nanced by a lump-sum such as social security tax in order to
maintain its employment e⁄ects, which would have no incentive e⁄ects on the employer.
However, there is much uncertainty regarding the degree of labour market ￿ exibility in South
Africa and the impact on employment, poverty, and inequality will likely to be minimal if factors
of production turn out to be highly complementary to one another, as would be expected with
labour market rigidities and structural problems. Under the low range of elasticity values, the
employment gains of a wage subsidy may be improved somewhat by supporting policies to relax
the skill constraint, to increase the productive capacity of the economy, or to redirect production
increases through economic incentives towards labour-intensive sectors.
Nonetheless, the employment gains from the introduction of complementary measures to the
wage subsidy in the low elasticity case still appear modest relative to the medium elasticity case.
Hence, our view is that labour market ￿ exibility is a critical factor. In fact, the combination of
a wage subsidy and some marginal easing of the skills and capital constraints and of policies to
improve labour market ￿ exibility appears promising as a short-term package of measures towards
the long-term solution of the unemployment problem. It is, however, still an interim step and any
enduring e⁄ort will require tackling the underlying factors to the unemployment in South Africa.
In addition to labour market ￿ exibility, several fundamental factors are suggested by the literature
review in the introduction. The presence of high mark-ups and concentration ratios in industries
point to the signi￿cance of imperfect competition, scale economies, and trade policies in a⁄ecting
labour market outcomes. The decline of the tradable sector and its employment impact also suggest
the importance of Dutch disease or the real exchange rate in a resource rich country. Temporal or
dynamic e⁄ects of schooling and training on human capital are another set of issues. To this end,
the inclusion of imperfect competition and scale economies in a general equilibrium framework is
16feasible but it will require signi￿cant changes in the analysis as elaborated, for examples, by Harris
(1984), Devarajan and Rodrik (1989), and Willenbockel (1994). The same is true with introducing
dynamics, particularly at the micro-simulation level. Since no model, no matter how elaborate, will
be able to address all these factors, this is an area suggested for future research.
5 Annexure
5.1 The Micro-simulation Model and Its Links to the CGE Model
Given that both the LFS and IES surveys are based mostly on the same sample of households, the
combined data set provides comprehensive information on household expenditures, labour and non-
labour income, labour supply, employment, and several socioeconomic characteristics of individuals
and households. The IES sample contains 26,687 households and 104,153 individuals. The LFS
sample consists of 105,792 individuals. When the two data sets are combined and observations
with missing sampling weights are dropped, the remaining number of individuals in our combined
database drops to 103,732 from 26,214 households. The ￿nal database for the micro-simulation model
includes 17 categories of food and non-food consumption expenditures, formal wage for employees
in formal sector, informal wage for informal market19, income for self-employees, employment status
for all the individuals in the sample, information on the unemployed individuals, a large number
of socio-economic and demographic characteristics of individual members of households, and non-
labour incomes at the household level. A list of the variables used in the micro-simulation model
and their description is provided in Table A4.
5.2 Occupational Component
The occupational component contains 16 categories: (E1) inactive and unemployed; (E2) formal
sector workers, low-skilled in agriculture; (E3) formal sector workers, semi-skilled in agriculture; (E4)
formal sector workers, high-skilled in agriculture; (E5) formal sector workers, low-skilled in industry;
(6) formal sector workers, semi-skilled in industry; (7) formal sector workers, high-skilled in industry;
(8) formal sector workers, low-skilled in services; (9) formal sector workers, semi-skilled in services;
(10) formal sector workers, high-skilled in services; (11) informal sector workers, agriculture; (12)
informal sector workers, industry; (13) informal sector workers, services; (14) self-employed workers,
agriculture; (15) self-employed workers, industry; and (16) self-employed workers, services.









where zi is a vector of observable characteristics of individual i. The category selected as a reference
is the inactive and unemployed. The multinomial logit model is motivated in terms of a utility
maximising behaviour, with the utility20 associated with activity j given as zi￿j + "ij. The second
term "ij represents the unobserved determinants of the utility of activity j. The utility of the
reference activity is set to zero. It is assumed that the random component of the activity-utility
follows the law of extreme values and is independently distributed across individuals and activities.
19LFS explicitly asks individuals their main activity including informal sector. More precisely, each employed
individual including informal workers are asked their organisation/business/enterprise/branch where she/he works in
the labor market (including domestic workers).
20This is the latent variable that governs occupational choice to the extent that people are believed to move to the
activity with the highest level of utility. However, Bourguignon and Ferreira (2005) note that such an interpretation
would not be valid in cases where occupational choices are constrained by the demand side of the market.
17In principle, the participation component (E1) of the earnings-generation model should be es-
timated jointly with the earnings equations de￿ned in the next sub-section. However, to avoid
the di¢ culties associated with joint estimation, we follow Bourguignon and Ferreira (2005) in their
reduced-form interpretation of the framework. Thus, the components are estimated separately with
the possibility of testing for selection bias at the level of earning equations. The reduced-form
estimates for the occupational model are presented in Table A1.
The results show some interesting and expected patterns. Gender has a signi￿cant impact on
probability of being employed in di⁄erent sectors. However, gender is not statistically signi￿cant
for being employed as formal low-skilled and formal high-skilled individuals in the service sector.
Among formal workers, people in industry and services sectors are more likely to be living in the
urban areas than people in the agricultural sector. It is also true for informal and self-employed
sectors. Similarly, the number of children (9 years at most) has a signi￿cant impact in the choice of
participating in the labour force. People are less likely to participate as formal workers. They are
more likely to be self-employed. Similarly, individuals living in households owning a family business
are more likely to be self-employed than paid workers. Being head of a household also plays a
signi￿cant role for participating in the labour force. Married people are more active in the labour
force than non-married couples.
[Insert Annex Table A1 about here]
5.3 Earnings
The earnings block of the micro-simulation model consists of three equations explaining formal wages,
informal wages, and self-employment income in terms of observable and non-observable individual
characteristics. The speci￿cation of these equations follows the Mincerian model. The wage equation
is written as:
log wi = xi￿w + uiw (2)
The set of observable characteristics, xi, used as explanatory variables includes: gender, years
of education, education squared, experience, experience squared, and a set of dummy variables
indicating head of household, residence in the urban area, union membership, and marital status.
The equations for the primary, secondary and tertiary sectors are estimated separately using OLS
(Table A2).21
Looking at the results in Table A2, variables such as education and experience have expected signs
and are consistent with standard human capital approach and economic theory. The relationship
between education variable and wage is mostly non-linear and the estimated coe¢ cients for education
(eduyear squared) are statistically signi￿cant at 1 percent, except for the primary high-skill group.
In the agricultural low-skill segment, three years of additional schooling will increase formal wage
income by 5.7 percent. In the manufacturing sector, three years of additional schooling will bring
2.4 percent more wage income for the low-skill formal workers. The returns to education are the
highest in the tertiary sector medium-skill segment - three years of additional schooling will increase
wage income by 9.6 percent.
Union membership has a strong positive impact on income of members, except for high-skill
individuals across economic sectors. The associated coe¢ cient is very signi￿cant statistically (at the
1 percent level). In agriculture, membership to a labour union brings about 60 percent more income
than non-membership (low-skill in tertiary sector and 37 percent for medium-skill formal workers),
other things being equal in the same sectors with similar characteristics. The pattern is similar in
the other sectors (e.g., about 40 percent in the manufacturing low￿ skill group and 28 percent for
manufacturing medium-skill, and 62 percent in the tertiary sector low￿ skill group).
21We also tried the Heckman method on both the wage and self-employment equations to account for possible
selection bias due to the fact that estimation is based on sub-samples of individuals with observed earnings in the
given activity. There was no signi￿cant di⁄erence in the results. We therefore stick with OLS.
18Another interesting result relates to the e⁄ect of urbanisation on wages. People living in the
urban areas earn, on average, 30 percent higher wages. This may be partly due to relatively higher
costs of living in urban areas as well as the structure of the labour markets, e.g., higher skills in
urban and non-agricultural sectors.
Another important determinant of wages is gender. Inferring from the gender dummy variable
(=1 for male; =0 for female) in Table A2, the higher pay of male employees ranges, on average, from
9 to 51 percent.
[Insert Annex Table A2 about here]
The informal wage equation (iw) is analogous to the formal wage equation:
log iwi = xi￿iw + uiiw (3)
Similarly, the speci￿cation of self-employment earnings (￿) is expressed as:
log ￿i = xi￿￿ + ui￿ (4)
Table A3 contains the results of the OLS estimation of both informal wage and self-employed income
equations.
Similar patterns are observed relative to the case of wage employment. For instance, in the
primary sector, heads of households earn 35 percent more from self-employment than non-heads of
household. This is much higher than the 20 percent premium they earn as wage employees in the
same sector. Similarly, self-employment pays more (15 to 30 percent) in the urban area than in the
rural area. However, this premium is lower than the one estimated for formal wage employment.
Finally, we observe that self-employment pays much more for highly skilled individuals than for the
other skill categories. Similarly, for people engaged in the formal sector of the economy.
[Insert Annex Table A3 about here]
5.4 Aggregation










￿iLi￿ + y0h (5)
The ￿rst two components add all earnings (wage and self-employment) across individuals and activ-
ities, while the last element is an exogenous unearned income such as transfers and capital income22.
The relative share of the other income varies signi￿cantly across income deciles. On average, 9
percent of the household income is derived from other sources of income which is non-wage income
for labourers and non-self-employed income for self-employed people. The ratio of other income to
the total income varies between 12 percent in the lowest decile to 9 percent in the richest decile in
the income distribution. Real income is obtained by de￿ ating total income by a household speci￿c
consumer price index CPIh. This is a weighted sum of prices of various commodities purchased by
the household weighted by the budget shares that vary across households.
5.5 Linking the Micro-Simulation Component to the CGE Model
To be able to assess the endowment, price and occupational e⁄ects of an oil price shock in a way
that fully account for heterogeneity at both individual- and household-levels requires appropriate
22All Other Income: Income derived from the sale of vehicles, ￿xed property, other property, rents collected,
payments received from boarders and other members of the household, lump sums resulting from employment before
retirement, gratuities and other lump sum payments received from pension, provident and other insurance or from
private persons, life insurance and inheritances received, claims, grants, total withdrawals from savings, remittances,
and other sources of income.
19channels of communication between the CGE model and the micro-simulation components. This
communication between the CGE model and the micro-simulation model works as follows. The
CGE model translates the impact of the shocks and policies through changes in relative prices
of commodities and factors, and through levels of employment. The micro-simulation model takes
these changes as exogenous and translates them into changes in household behaviour which underpins
changes in earnings, occupational status and welfare.
To obtain meaningful results from the simulation framework, one must ensure that outcomes
from the micro-simulation model are consistent with the aggregate results from the CGE model
both before and after the shock. This implies that the links between the two models must respect
a set of consistency constraints, which require that the observed occupational choices predicted by
the micro-simulation model match the employment shares in the CGE model. Similarly, simulated
earnings at the micro level must match macro predictions.23 A key consideration here stems from
the fact that occupational choice depends on the random utility function which is a latent variable.
For example, a policy change might cause unemployed or inactive individuals to become employed in
one of the segments of the labour market. Implementation of the consistency constraints, therefore,
requires information on both the observable and non-observable components of the occupational
and earning models. The observable components of these models are calculated on the basis of
estimated parameters and data on observable characteristics. For those showing zero earnings,
counterfactual earnings are computed on the basis their observable characteristics, estimates of
the relevant coe¢ cients, and residuals drawn from a normal distribution with the same standard
deviation as the distribution of residuals for those individuals with nonzero earnings.
In practice, di⁄erences underlying the micro and macro data (sampling weights, coverage, im-
puted values, etc.) make it very di¢ cult to fully enforce the consistency constraints described above.
We therefore adopt several steps to achieve the consistency. First, because of the importance of the
labour market structure in South Africa, we ensure that the occupational choices in the micro sim-
ulation have the same classi￿cation as the labour categories in the CGE model and capture the
appropriate taxonomy, structural and unemployment issues in South Africa. Second, the base years
for the SAM (2003) and the survey data (2000) in our study of South Africa are di⁄erent. In or-
der to retain the more recent numbers in the macro accounts as well as the familiar poverty and
inequality measurements of the micro data, we employ percent changes to communicate changes in
employment, wages, and prices from the CGE to the micro simulation.24
As noted by Bourguignon, Robilliard and Robinson (2002), reconciliation in the post-shock micro
simulation means adjusting the intercepts (or constant terms) of the wage and occupational functions
to ensure that changes predicted by the income generation model are consistent with those predicted
by the CGE model.
[Insert Annex Table A4 about here]
References
[1] Aghion, Philippe, Matias Braun, and Johannes Fedderke. 2006. ￿Competition and Produc-
tivity Growth in South Africa.￿CID Working Paper No. 132. Harvard University Center for
International Development
[2] Altman, Miriam. 2007. ￿What are the policy implications of the informal sector becoming
the informal economy￿ , prepared for the conference on Employment and Development, Bonn,
Germany.
23Bourguignon, Robilliard and Robinson (2002) explain that benchmark consistency could be achieved by ensuring
that the calibration of the CGE is compatible with the consistency constraints.
24Savard (2006) discusses a way to achieve consistency in a case when the SAM of the CGE model and the survey
data of the micro simulation have the same base year.
20[3] Banerjee, Abhijit, Sebastian Galiani, Jim Levinsohn, Zoº McLaren, and Ingrid Woolard. 2007.
￿Why Has Unemployment Risen in the New South Africa.￿NBER Working Paper No. 13167
National Bureau of Economic Research, USA. (See also CID Working Paper No. 136, October
2006).
[4] Bhorat, H. 2001. ￿Employment Trends in South Africa.￿FES and DPRU Occasional Paper,
No. 2, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung and Development Policy Research Unit.
[5] Bhorat, H. and M. Leibbrandt. 1996. ￿Understanding Unemployment. The Relationship be-
tween the Employed and the Jobless.￿ In Baskin, J. (ed.) Against the Current. Labour and
Economic Policy in South Africa. NALEDI: Randburg.
[6] Bhorat, H. and M. Oosthuizen. 2005. ￿The Post-Apartheid South African Labour Market.￿
DPRU Working Paper 05/93. Development Policy Research Unit. University of Cape Town.
[7] Bourguignon, Fran￿ois., and F. H. G. Ferreira. 2005. ￿Decomposing Changes in the Distribution
of Household Incomes: Methodological Aspects.￿In F. Bourguignon, F. H. G. Ferreira, and N.
Lustig, eds., The Microeconomics of Income Distribution Dynamics in East Asia and Latin
America. New York: Oxford University Press.
[8] Bourguignon, Fran￿ois, Ann-Sophie Robillard, and Sherman Robinson. 2002. ￿Representative
vs. Real Households in the Macroeconomic Modeling of Inequality.￿International Food Policy
Research Institute, Washington, DC. Processed.
[9] Carlin, Wendy and David Soskice. (2006). Macroeconomics ￿ Imperfections, Institutions &
Policies. Oxford University Press.
[10] Chandra, V., L. Moorty, B. Rajaratnam, and K. Schaefer. 2001. ￿Constraints to Growth and
Employment in South Africa: Statistics from the Large Manufacturing Firm Survey.￿World
Bank Informal Discussion Papers on Aspects of the South African Economy no. 14, The South-
ern Africa Department. Washington, DC.: The World Bank.
[11] Devarajan and Rodrik. 1989. ￿Trade Liberalization in Developing Countries: Do Imperfect
Competition and Scale E⁄ects Matter?￿American Economic Review, 79, 2:283-287.
[12] Dinkelman,T. and F. Pirouz. 2000. ￿Individual, Household and Regional Determinants of
Labour Force Attachment in South Africa: Preliminary Evidence from the 1997 October House-
hold Survey.￿TIPS. September.
[13] Edwards, L. 2001. ￿Globalization and the Skill Bias of Occupational Employment in South
Africa.￿South African Journal of Economics, 69, 1: 40-71.
[14] Essama-Nssah, B. Del￿n S. Go, Marna Kearney, Vijdan Korman, Sherman Robinson, and
Karen Thierfelder. 2007. ￿Economy-wide and Distributional Impact of an Oil Price Shock on
the South African Economy.￿World Bank Policy Working Paper 4354. Washington, DC.: The
World Bank.
[15] Fallon,P. and R. Lucas.1998. ￿South African Labour Markets Adjustments and Inequalities.￿
World Bank Informal Discussion Paper No. 12: Washington, DC.: The World Bank.
[16] Fallon, P. and L. Pereira da Silva. 1994. ￿South Africa: Economic Performance and Policies.￿
World Bank Informal Discussion Papers on Aspects of the South African Economy no. 12, The
Southern Africa Department. Washington, DC.: The World Bank
[17] Fedderke, Johannes, Chandana Kularatne, and Martine Mariotti. 2006. ￿Mark-up Pricing in
South African Industry.￿Journal of African Economies, Vol. 16 No.1: 28-69 (July).
21[18] Fedderke, J., Y. Shin and P. Vase. 1999. ￿Trade and Labour Usage: An Examination of the
South African Manufacturing Industry.￿ERSA Working Paper, No. 15. Econometric Research
Southern Africa.
[19] Go, Del￿n S., Marna Kearney, Sherman Robinson, and Karen Thierfelder. 2005. ￿An Analysis
of South Africa￿ s Value Added Tax.￿Policy Research Working Paper 3671, Washington, DC.:
The World Bank.
[20] Harris, Richard G. 1984. ￿Applied General Equilibrium Analysis of Small Open Economies with
Scale Economies and Imperfect Competition.￿American Economic Review, 74, 1016-32.
[21] Hausmann, Ricardo (2008). ￿Final Recommendations of the International Panel on Growth.￿
Mimeo.
[22] Kearney, Marna. 2004. Restructuring Value-Added Tax in South Africa, A Computable General
Equilibrium Analysis, Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Pretoria, Pretoria, South Africa.
[23] Kingdom, G.G. and Knight, J. 2000. ￿Unemployment in South Africa: The Nature of the
Beast.￿TIPS 2000 Annual Forum, Trade and Industrial Policy Secretariat.
[24] Korman, Vijdan. 2006. ￿A Micro-simulation Model to Assess Poverty Impact of Oil Shock in
South Africa.￿Washington, DC.: The World Bank. Processed.
[25] Levinsohn, James (2008). ￿Two Policies to Alleviate Unemployment in South Africa.￿ CID
Working Paper No. 166. Harvard University Center for International Development.
[26] Lewis, Je⁄rey D. 2001. ￿Policies to Promote Growth and Employment in South Africa￿ . Wash-
ington, DC.: The World Bank.
[27] Lofgren, Hans, Rebecca L. Harris and Sherman Robinson. 2001. ￿A Standard Computable
General Equilibrium (CGE) Model in GAMS.￿IFPRI Discussion Paper, (75):8- 19. May 2001.
http://www.ifpri.org
[28] Moll, Peter G. 1993. ￿Black South African Unions: Relative E⁄ects in International Perspec-
tives,￿Industrial and Labor Relations Review 46 (E2), 245-61.
[29] Moolman, E. 2003. ￿An Econometric Analysis of Labour Demand at an Industry Level in South
Africa.￿Trade and Industrial Policy Strategies (TIPS).
[30] Nattrass, N. 2000. ￿The Debate about Unemployment in the 1990s.￿Studies in Economics and
Econometrics, 24,3: 73-90.
[31] Nickell, S., I. Nunziata, W. Ochell, and G. Quintini. 2003. ￿The Beveridge Curve, Unemploy-
ment and Wages in OECD from the 1960s to the 1990s.￿In P. Aghion, R. Frydman, J. Stiglitz,
and W. Woodford, eds., Knowledge, Information and Expectations in Modern Macroeconomics:
In Honor of Edmond S. Phelps. Princeton University Press.
[32] Pauw, Kalie and Lawrence Edwards. 2006. ￿Evaluating the General Equilibrium E⁄ects of a
Wage Subsidy for South Africa.￿South African Journal of Economics. Vol. 74:3 (September).
[33] Poswell, L. 2002. ￿The Post-Apartheid South African Labour Market: A Status Report.￿De-
velopment Policy Research Unit. February
[34] Robilliard, Anne-Sophie and Sherman Robinson. 2006. "The Social Impact of a WTO Agree-
ment in Indonesia." In Thomas W. Hertel and L. Alan Winters, eds. Poverty and the WTO:
Impacts of the Doha Development Agenda. Washington and New York: World Bank and Pal-
grave Macmillan.
22[35] Rodrik, Dani (2006). ￿Understanding South Africa￿ s Economic Puzzles.￿CID Working Paper
No. 130. Harvard University Center for International Development.
[36] Roy, A. D. 1951. ￿Some Thoughts on the Distribution of Earnings.￿Oxford Economic Papers,
3(E2): 135-146.
[37] Savard, Luc. 2006. Analyse de la pauvretØ et distribution des revenus dans le cadre de la
modØlisation en Øquilibre gØnØral calculable. Ph.D dissertation, Ecole des Hautes Etudes en
Sciences Sociales.
[38] Savard, Luc. 2003. ￿A Segmented Endogenous Labour Market for Poverty, Income Distribution
Analysis in a CGE-Household MS Model: A Top-Down/Bottom-Up Approach.￿Working Paper
CIRPEE, UniversitØ Laval #03-43.
[39] Standing, G., J. Sender, and J. Weeks. 1996. Restructuring the Labour Market. International
Labour Organization, Geneva.
[40] Statistics South Africa (StatsSA). 2006. Labour Force Survey. September 2006.
www.statssa.gov.za
[41] Statistics South Africa. 2000. Income and Expenditure Survey.
[42] Statistics South Africa. 2000. Labour Force Survey.
[43] Willenbockel, Dirk (1994). Applied General Equilibrium Modeling ￿Imperfect Competition and
European Integration. New York: John Wiley & Sons.
23 
 
Tables and Figures 
 






Source: Authors’ calculations from a SAM for South Africa, 2003. 
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24Figure 3: Poverty Profile of Formal Wage Workers by Skill Types 













































Source: Authors’ calculations from LFS 2000. 
 
 
Figure 4: Earnings by Gender (2000 prices) 














































Source: Authors’ calculations from LFS 2000. 
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  Source: CGE model simulations. 
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Sim 1 Sim2  
Note: Simulation 1:10 percent wage subsidy given to employers for low and semi-skill in formal sector.  Simulation 
2: Adding social security tax  to simulation 1. 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
 
27Table 1:  CGE Model Sectors 
AGRICULTURE INDUSTRY    SERVICES 
Agriculture  Coal Mining  Electricity & Gas & Steam 
  Gold & Uranium Ore Mining  Water Supply 
  Other Mining  Construction & Civil Engineering 
 Food  Catering  &  Accommodation 
  Beverages & Tobacco  Wholesale & Retail Trade 
 Textiles  Transportation  &  Storage 
 Wearing  Apparel  Communication 
  Leather & Leather Products  Financial Services 
 Footwear  Business  Services 
  Wood & Wood Products  Health & Community & Social & Personal Services 
   Paper & Paper Products  Other  Producers 
  Printing & Publishing & Recorded Media  Government Services 
  Coke & Refined Petroleum Products   
 Basic  Chemicals   
  Other Chemicals & Man-Made Fibers   
 Rubber  Products   
 Plastic  Products   
  Glass & Glass Products   
 Non-metallic  Minerals   
  Basic Iron & Steel   
  Basic Non-ferrous Metals   
  Metal Products Excluding Machinery   
 Electrical  Machinery   
  TV & Radio & Communication Equip   
   Professional & Scientific Equip   
  Motor Vehicles Parts & Accessories   
  Other Transport Equipment   
 Furniture   
 Other  Industries   
Source: CGE model, Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) database. 
 
Table 2: Value Added Shares 
  Agriculture Industry  Services 
Capital  0.76 0.54 0.45 
High-skilled formal labour  0.03 0.12 0.25 
Semi-skilled formal labour  0.02 0.12 0.18 
Low-skilled formal labour  0.11 0.15 0.04 
Self-employed labour*  0.04 0.03 0.04 
Informal labour*  0.04 0.04 0.04 
Notes: *Self-employed and informal labour are further distributed by skill (not shown). 
Source: Authors’ calculations from a SAM for South Africa, 2003. 
 
 
28Table 3: Employment by Sector and Occupation 
Occupational  Types  Agriculture   Industry   Services   Total 
1. Formal Low-Skilled Workers  6.0  2.9  5.7  14.6 
2. Formal Semi-Skilled Workers  6.2  8.7  16.5  31.3 
3. Formal High-Skilled Workers  0.7  1.3  9.6  11.6 
4. Informal Sector Workers*  2.7  2.5  13.9  19.2 
5. Self-Employed*  9.1  2.8  11.5  23.4 
Total 24.6  18.2  57.2  100.0 
Notes: *Self-employed and informal labour are further distributed by skill (not shown). 






Table 4:   Formal Wage Employment by Economic Sector, 2000 (%) 
Economic Sector  Working,Very Poor*  Working,Poor**  Non-Poor*** 
Agriculture 36.5  16.0  1.1 
Mining 2.1  8.0  7.3 
Manufacturing 11.0  18.0  18.8 
Electricity, gas and water supply  0.5  1.0  1.6 
Construction 5.6  6.0  2.8 
Wholesale and retail trade  23.3  23.0  12.1 
Transport 2.3  5.0  6.8 
Financial Services  5.2  9.0  13.9 
Community, Social and Personal  
Services 9.8  14.0  35.6 
Private households    3.6  2.0  0.2 




‘Working, very poor’: annual wage for ‘working very poor’ is calculated using R1000 per month (2004).Using the CPI 
for 2004 and 2000, the annual wage of ‘working very poor’ comes to about R9,695. [1000/(123.8/100)]*12. 
** 
 
‘Working, Poor’: annual wage for ‘working poor’ is calculated using R2500 per month (2004) benchmark   In 2000 
prices, the annual wage for this group is about R24,233.[2500/(123.8/100)]*12. 
***  ‘Non poor’: Formal workers are those with an annual income higher than R24,233. 
Source: Authors’ calculations from LFS 2000. 
29Table 5: Average Earnings of Labour Market by Education Level  
Education Level   Annual Average Earnings (rand-2000 prices) 
   Formal Labour   Informal Labour   Self-employed 
No Schooling             15,028                5,942                 8,367  
Grade 0-6            16,710                6,773                 9,400  
Grade 7-9            22,983              10,614               12,776  
Grade 10-12            44,327              16,139               35,696  
National Technical Certificate 
1           60,628              43,417               72,725  
Degree and Post-Graduate          119,939             124,957             147,296  
Overall Average            41,582              11,728               25,829  





Table 6: Average Earnings of Labour Market by Regions (2000 prices) 
Region   Annual Average Earnings(rand) 
   Formal Labour   Informal Labour   Self-employed 
Rural              21,872                9,360        13,299  
Urban             48,028              13,310        41,692  
Overall Average             41,582              11,728        25,829  
Source: Authors’ calculations from LFS 2000. 
 
                                                 
1 National Technical Certificate includes three levels, NTCi- NTCiii, which are equivalent to high school grades 10-
12.  
30Table 7: Translog Elasticity Multipliers 




























Capital  0 0.5  1  1.5 0.5  1 1.5  0.5  1 1.5 
High-skilled formal     0  1  0.25 1.5  1  0.25 1.5  1  0.25 
Med-skilled formal       0  1  1  1.5  1  1  1.5  1 
Low-skilled formal         0 0.25  1  1.5  0.25 1  1.5 
High-skilled self          0  1  0.25  1.5 1  0.25 
Med-skilled self             0  1  1  1.5  1 
Low-skilled self               0  0.25  1  1.5 
High-skilled 
informal                 0  1  0.25 
Med-skilled 
informal                   0  1 
Low-skilled 
informal                             0 
Source: CGE model database. 
 
Table 8: Reference Elasticity of Substitution in Production, by Activity 
Activity Elasticity    Activity Elasticity 
Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries  0.60    Metal Products Excluding Machinery  0.60 
Coal Mining  0.20    Machinery and Equipment  0.25 
Gold and Uranium Ore Mining  0.20    Electrical Machinery  0.60 
Other Mining  0.20    TV, Radio, and Communication Equip  0.60 
Food 0.60    Professional and Scientific Equip  0.60 
Beverages and Tobacco  0.40    Motor Vehicles Parts and Accessories  0.25 
Textiles 0.30    Other Transport Equipment  0.25 
Wearing Apparel  0.60    Furniture 0.25 
Leather and Leather Products  0.60    Other Industries  0.60 
Footwear 0.29    Electricity, Gas, and Steam  0.60 
Wood and Wood Products  0.25    Water Supply   0.60 
Paper and Paper Products  0.60    Construction and Civil Engineering  0.60 
Printing, Publishing, and Recorded Media  0.34    Wholesale and Retail Trade  0.60 
Coke and Refined Petroleum Products  0.44    Catering and Accommodation  0.60 
Basic Chemicals  0.60    Transportation and Storage  0.60 
Other Chemicals and Man-Made Fibers  0.60    Communication 0.60 
Rubber Products  0.44    Financial Services  0.60 
Plastic Products  0.44    Business Services  0.60 
Glass and Glass Products  0.35    Health, Community, Social, and Personal Services  0.60 
Non-metallic Minerals  0.61    Other  Producers  0.60 
Basic Iron and Steel  0.25    Government Services  0.60 
Basic Non-ferrous Metals  0.25      
Source: CGE model database. 
31Table 9: Employment change (%) of 10% wage subsidy to low-skilled and medium-skilled formal 
labour 
  Base Low Medium  High
Low-skilled formal labour  3451.5 3.3 6.7  12.2
   Agriculture  761.6 4.9 10.8  21.2
   Industry  1069.7 2.1 4.1  7.1
   Services  1620.2 3.3 6.5  11.2
Medium-skilled formal labour  3207.0 3.0 6.2  12.2
   Agriculture  34.7 3.8 8.6  18.4
   Industry  432.2 2.5 5.0  9.8
   Services  2740.1 3.1 6.4  12.5
High-skilled formal labour  1300.7 0.0 0.0  0.0
   Agriculture  16.4 0.3 1.0  2.5
   Industry  133.4 0.2 0.3  0.4
   Services  1150.9 0.0 0.0  -0.1
Informal labour  2913.4 0.0 0.0  0.0
   Agriculture  301.8 0.0 1.8  5.0
   Industry  357.3 0.1 0.2  0.3
   Services  2254.3 0.0 -0.3  -0.7
Self-employed labour  346.3 0.0 0.0  0.0
   Agriculture  18.2 0.3 1.4  3.8
   Industry  43.1 0.1 0.1  0.0
   Services  285.1 0.0 -0.1  -0.3
Total labour force  11218.9 1.9 3.8  7.2
Source: CGE model simulations. 
 
 
Table 10: Percent Change in Real GDP given 10% wage subsidy to low-skilled and medium-skilled 
formal labour 
 
   Base Low  Medium  High 
   (Billion R)  10%  10%  10% 
Absorption 1231.0 0.6 1.3  2.4
Household Consumption  786.3 1.0 2.0  3.8
Fixed investment  200.3 0.0 0.0  0.0
Inventory 5.3 0.0 0.0  0.0
Government consumption  239.1 0.0 0.0  0.0
Exports 339.8 0.6 1.1  2.1
Imports -319.4 0.6 1.2  2.3
GDP at market prices  1251.5 0.6 1.3  2.4
Source: CGE model simulations. 
 
32Table 11 Government revenue (billion rand) and fiscal cost of wage subsidy  
(10% wage subsidy to low-skilled and medium-skilled formal labour) 
   Base Low Medium High
   10% 10% 10%
Direct tax   169.0 172.7  173.5 174.9
Indirect tax          
  Tariffs  8.3 8.3  8.4 8.5
  Domestic  62.5 63.1  63.5 64.3
Net VAT  69.6 70.2  70.7 71.7
Total tax revenue  309.4 314.3  316.1 319.3
Additional tax revenue  
(revenue effect from existing taxes due to increased employment 
and GDP)  4.9  6.8 10.0
Wage subsidy cost   0.0 -19.7  -20.5 -21.9
Net wage subsidy cost (implied lump sum tax)     -14.7  -13.7 -11.9
Effective wage subsidy rate (percent of the cost not covered by the 
revenue effect)    74.9  67.0 54.5
Wage subsidy cost per job created (R per job)     90758.4  47406.5 27039.8




Table 12: Poverty Indicators, by Region, Population Deciles, and Education  Level 
  
 
Poverty Indicators (%)  Variation from Base  Difference 
   Base Sim1 Sim2 Sim1  Sim2  Sim2-Sim1 
1. National Headcount Ratio 
Proportion of Poor  0.491  0.476  0.477  -1.6  -1.46  0.09 
2. Regional Decomposition (Headcount ratio) 
Urban   0.335  0.319  0.320  -1.6  -1.51  0.08 
Rural 0.721  0.706  0.707  -1.5  -1.39  0.09 
3. Population Deciles  
Poorest 0.952  0.929  0.929  -2.3  -2.24  0.03 
2 0.934  0.909  0.909  -2.5  -2.53  0.01 
3 0.884  0.859  0.860  -2.5  -2.39  0.07 
4 0.796  0.768  0.769  -2.8  -2.69  0.11 
5 0.561  0.538  0.539  -2.2  -2.15  0.07 
6 0.351  0.343  0.343  -0.8  -0.80  0.00 
7 0.186  0.179  0.183  -0.7  -0.29  0.42 
8 0.114  0.107  0.108  -0.7  -0.54  0.12 
9 0.078  0.074  0.074  -0.5  -0.45  0.02 
Richest 0.085  0.050  0.050  -3.6  -3.55  0.03 
4. Level of Education of Head of the Household (Headcount Ratio) 
No Schooling   0.783  0.774  0.774  -0.9  -0.86  0.01 
Grade 0-6  0.620  0.605  0.606  -1.5  -1.36  0.17 
Grade 7-9  0.479  0.447  0.448  -3.2  -3.09  0.13 
Grade 10-12  0.257  0.241  0.241  -1.6  -1.57  0.05 
NTC Level  0.146  0.126  0.126  -2.0  -1.99  0.00 
Degree  and Post Graduate  0.078  0.066  0.067  -1.2  -1.05  0.10 
Notes: Poverty line is taken as 1 dollar per day. Exchange rate is rand 6.95 /1 dollar in 2000 prices.  Per capita 
income is used as a welfare measure of household. Simulation 1: 10 percent wage subsidy given to employers for 










   Base Sim1  Sim2 Sim1  Sim2 
Sim2-
Sim1 
1. National Level 
General Entropy (0)  1.22  1.19  1.19  -0.02  -0.02  0.00 
General Entropy (1)  1.20  1.18  1.19  -0.02  -0.02  0.01 
Gini Coefficient  0.72  0.71  0.72  -0.4  -0.4  0.1 
            
2. Regional Decomposition 
Urban            
General Entropy (0)  1.02  1.00  1.00  -0.02  -0.02  0.00 
General Entropy (1)  1.01  0.99  1.00  -0.02  -0.02  0.01 
Gini Coefficient  0.67  0.67  0.67  -0.5  -0.5  0.3 
Rural           
General Entropy (0)  1.13  1.12  1.11  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01 
General Entropy (1)  1.46  1.43  1.43  -0.02  -0.02  0.00 
Gini Coefficient  0.71  0.71  0.70  -0.5  -0.5  -0.2 
            
3. Population Deciles (Gini Coefficient) 
Poorest   0.55  0.57  0.57  2.0  2.0  0.0 
2 0.52  0.55  0.55  3.2  3.2  0.0 
3 0.52  0.53  0.53  1.5  1.5  0.0 
4 0.43  0.45  0.45  1.8  1.8  0.0 
5 0.37  0.39  0.39  2.0  2.0  0.0 
6 0.39  0.39  0.39  0.4  0.4  0.0 
7 0.40  0.40  0.40  0.3  0.3  0.0 
8 0.34  0.35  0.35  0.8  0.8  0.0 
9 0.32  0.32  0.32  -0.1  -0.1  0.0 
Richest 0.44  0.44  0.44  -0.2  -0.2  0.0 
4. Level of Education of head of the household (Gini Coefficient) 
No Schooling   0.62  0.62  0.61  0.00  -0.4  -0.4 
Grade 0-6  0.61  0.61  0.60  -0.01  -0.6  -0.4 
Grade 7-9  0.62  0.61  0.60  -0.01  -0.8  -0.2 
Grade 10-12  0.60  0.59  0.60  -0.01  -0.7  0.3 
NTC Level  0.50  0.46  0.47  -0.03  -3.3  0.5 
Degree  and Post Graduate  0.53  0.53  0.53  0.00  -0.4  0.3 
Notes: Simulation 1: 10 percent wage subsidy given to employers for low- and semi-skill in formal sector. 
Simulation 2: Adding social security tax to simulation 1. 
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Table 14: Sensitivity of Wage Subsidy Effect on Employment  to Supporting Measure that Ease Skill 
Constraint or Promote Labour Intensive Activities 
% change in employment 
10% wage 
subsidy 










given  policy 
intervention 
Employment gains of 
wage subsidy plus 
policy over wage 
subsidy alone 
   (i)  (ii)  (iii)  (iv)=(iii) -(ii)  (v)=(iv)-(i) 
          
I.    Intervention: 5% Increase in the Supply of Skilled Labour     
          
Set A.   Low elasticity case (0.5*Reference Elasticities) 
          
medium-skilled formal  3.086   1.146   4.297 3.151   0.068 
low-skilled formal  3.464   3.173   6.508 3.335 -0.130 
          
          
Set B.  Slightly higher low elasticity case (0.75*Reference Elasticities) 
          
medium-skilled formal  4.814  0.828   5.766 4.938 0.124 
low-skilled formal  5.360  2.830   8.348 5.518 0.158 
          
          
II.      Intervention: Intervention I plus  5% Increase in Capital 
          
Set A.   Low elasticity case (0.5*Reference Elasticities) 
          
medium-skilled formal  3.086 4.929  8.277  3.348 0.265 
low-skilled formal  3.464  5.530 9.099 3.569 0.104 
          
          
Set B.  Slightly higher low elasticity case (0.75*Reference Elasticities) 
          
medium-skilled formal  4.814  4.767    9.920  5.183  0.339 
low-skilled formal  5.360  6.154        11.897  5.743  0.383 
          
   
III.      Intervention:  Intervention II plus 10%  production subsidy to Activities with High Value Added Shares in Low-Skilled and 
Medium Skilled Labour 
          
Set A.   Low elasticity case (0.5*Reference Elasticities) 
          
medium-skilled formal  3.086  6.644 9.915 3.271   0.188 
low-skilled formal  3.464  7.927       11.498 3.571   0.106 
          
          
Set B.  Slightly higher low elasticity case (0.75*Reference Elasticities) 
          
medium-skilled formal  4.814 6.998  12.175  5.177 0.363 
low-skilled formal  5.360  9.023 14.870 5.847 0.487 
          
Source: CGE model simulations. 
 
36Table A1: Occupational Choice Models for Individuals 
Industry Services Agriculture  Industry Services Agriculture Industry Services
Variables Low-Skill Semi-Skill High-Skill Low-Skill Semi-Skill High-Skill Low-Skill Semi-Skill High-Skill
Gender 0.82 2.442 1.563 0.909 1.192 1.043 -0.057 0.583 -0.102 0.993 1.762 -0.78 0.123 0.25 -0.321
[14.06]** [24.12]** [7.22]** [11.31]** [22.85]** [7.31]** [1.01] [15.74]** [1.75] [11.88]** [17.31]** [19.00]** [2.70]** [2.88]** [6.24]**
Education 
(years) -0.01 -0.086 -0.222 0.062 0.07 -0.055 0.071 0.002 0.221 -0.072 0.035 -0.038 -0.073 -0.144 -0.143
[0.43] [3.40]** [3.16]** [1.85] [3.22]** [0.77] [2.99]** [0.14] [3.68]** [2.25]* [1.02] [2.60]** [4.18]** [4.81]** [7.78]**
Education-
squared  -0.009 0.003 0.029 -0.003 0.002 0.023 -0.002 0.011 0.021 -0.003 -0.004 0.001 0.009 0.015 0.015
[4.44]** [2.11]* [8.67]** [1.29] [1.31] [7.45]** [0.95] [10.82]** [8.74]** [1.04] [1.57] [0.78] [6.92]** [8.02]** [12.76]**
Experience 
(years) 0.124 0.221 0.215 0.18 0.214 0.219 0.19 0.167 0.254 0.132 0.212 0.184 0.032 0.205 0.168
[14.39]** [20.72]** [7.62]** [15.19]** [27.79]** [10.63]** [22.19]** [30.57]** [26.83]** [10.93]** [16.12]** [32.38]** [5.37]** [15.69]** [24.11]**
Experience-
squared -0.003 -0.004 -0.004 -0.003 -0.004 -0.004 -0.003 -0.003 -0.005 -0.003 -0.004 -0.003 0 -0.003 -0.003
[18.58]** [23.53]** [7.30]** [15.48]** [27.53]** [9.77]** [21.48]** [29.52]** [23.27]** [12.93]** [16.53]** [32.70]** [0.53] [14.91]** [22.26]**
Urban  -2.181 -1.119 -0.366 0.781 0.891 1.549 0.691 0.816 0.449 -1.91 -0.237 0.408 -2.468 -0.108 0.128
[26.83]** [18.97]** [2.21]* [9.13]** [16.14]** [7.57]** [11.37]** [18.94]** [6.95]** [17.41]** [2.91]** [10.41]** [33.99]** [1.29] [2.51]*
Nchild09 -0.292 -0.485 -0.332 -0.08 -0.084 -0.129 -0.07 -0.107 -0.049 -0.172 -0.063 -0.204 0.107 -0.159 -0.071
[12.96]** [16.55]** [4.04]** [2.69]** [4.45]** [2.35]* [3.31]** [7.10]** [2.11]* [5.91]** [2.04]* [13.49]** [8.39]** [5.00]** [4.06]**
Married 0.903 1.282 1.297 0.526 0.711 1.248 0.283 0.663 0.656 0.657 0.222 0.236 0.274 0.488 0.503
[14.45]** [18.18]** [6.55]** [6.37]** [13.80]** [9.03]** [4.91]** [16.85]** [11.29]** [7.53]** [2.45]* [5.98]** [5.41]** [5.48]** [9.46]**
Own family 
business -1.081 -0.624 -0.567 -0.333 -0.197 -0.223 -0.242 0.004 -0.427 -0.661 -0.135 -0.08 0.685 4.088 4.845
[7.42]** [5.05]** [1.98]* [2.47]* [2.55]* [1.26] [2.51]* [0.07] [5.01]** [3.80]** [0.98] [1.28] [12.03]** [38.58]** [66.28]**
Education for 
head  -0.026 0.04 0.058 -0.025 -0.01 0.05 -0.03 0.035 0.045 -0.036 -0.006 -0.013 0.003 -0.005 0.005
[2.64]** [2.62]** [1.75] [2.02]* [1.22] [2.10]* [3.31]** [6.22]** [5.12]** [2.53]* [0.43] [2.11]* [0.43] [0.35] [0.70]
Dummy for  
head 1.44 2.11 1.27 1.073 1.279 1.316 1.349 1.237 1.292 1.26 1.294 1.342 0.708 1.946 1.976
[21.86]** [23.83]** [5.89]** [12.12]** [22.83]** [8.76]** [21.47]** [29.83]** [20.11]** [13.47]** [13.05]** [32.23]** [12.89]** [19.72]** [33.48]**
Constant -3.485 -7.37 -10.084 -6.969 -7.324 -11.818 -6.223 -6.268 -11.408 -4.552 -7.326 -4.059 -3.474 -8.943 -7.735
[26.98]** [41.28]** [20.77]** [35.02]** [54.59]** [24.27]** [43.17]** [59.43]** [29.90]** [24.12]** [33.54]** [44.72]** [34.49]** [38.92]** [57.81]**
Sample Size 65113 65113 65113 65113 65113 65113 65113 65113 65113 65113 65113 65113 65113 65113 65113
Notes:Absolute value of z statistics in brackets. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Agriculture 
Formal    Employees Informal Employees Self Employees
Source: Authors’ calculations.  See Essama et al. (2007)
37Table A2: OLS Estimates of the Formal Wage Equation 
Agriculture  Sector  Industry  Sector  Services  Sector
Variables Low Skill Medium Skill High Skill Low Skill
Medium 
Skill High Skill Low Skill
Medium 
Skill High Skill
gender 0.227 0.154 0.512 0.298 0.29 0.233 0.245 0.142 0.092
[6.34]** [2.08]* [1.99]* [5.83]** [8.69]** [1.97]* [5.89]** [5.76]** [2.70]**
eduyear 0.007 -0.03 0.107 -0.01 -0.077 -0.002 -0.015 0.014 -0.047
[0.57] [2.15]* [1.20] [0.46] [5.83]** [0.04] [0.95] [1.27] [2.26]*
eduyear2 0.004 0.01 0.001 0.006 0.011 0.007 0.005 0.006 0.007
[3.59]** [8.96]** [0.24] [3.81]** [12.97]** [3.14]** [4.23]** [9.01]** [8.10]**
expyear 0.033 0.065 0.009 0.032 0.038 0.051 0.038 0.031 0.034
[6.06]** [8.72]** [0.31] [4.06]** [7.45]** [3.15]** [5.50]** [8.13]** [6.11]**
expyear2 0 -0.001 0 0 0 -0.001 0 0 -0.001
[5.30]** [7.74]** [0.00] [2.33]* [4.76]** [2.13]* [4.06]** [5.04]** [4.55]**
headd 0.056 0.112 0.216 0.051 0.058 0.189 0.149 0.117 0.218
[1.49] [1.83] [0.88] [0.97] [1.77] [1.60] [3.44]** [4.60]** [6.31]**
urban 0.408 0.362 0.658 0.31 0.295 0.395 0.273 0.303 0.309
[8.35]** [9.82]** [4.53]** [5.92]** [8.80]** [2.43]* [6.47]** [10.86]** [8.17]**
union 0.569 0.556 -0.033 0.408 0.272 -0.108 0.624 0.404 0.056
[11.83]** [15.51]** [0.22] [8.59]** [9.85]** [1.18] [15.32]** [17.82]** [1.89]
married 0.033 0.094 -0.077 0.089 0.193 0.018 0.038 0.253 0.173
[1.00] [2.16]* [0.35] [1.78] [6.32]** [0.18] [0.93] [10.70]** [5.27]**
Constant 7.792 7.674 8.368 8.039 8.229 8.41 7.943 8.031 9.174
[97.87]** [62.41]** [13.84]** [60.69]** [98.18]** [22.51]** [71.85]** [115.94]** [62.64]**
Sample Size 1665 1713 123 804 2412 368 1588 4544 2649
R-squared 0.26 0.42 0.41 0.29 0.31 0.37 0.28 0.32 0.24
Notes: Absolute value of t statistics in bracket. Significance level * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%  
Source: Authors’ calculations.  See Essama et al. (2007). 
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Table A3: OLS Estimates of the Informal and Self Employees Income Equation 
 














gender 0.095 0.347 0.254 0.146 0.605 0.45
[1.34] [3.88]** [8.43]** [3.52]** [7.40]** [10.81]**
eduyear -0.01 0.041 -0.045 -0.059 0.027 -0.024
[0.49] [1.44] [4.73]** [4.12]** [1.02] [1.79]
eduyear2 0.007 0.002 0.011 0.011 0.004 0.007
[4.00]** [1.08] [14.53]** [10.44]** [2.60]** [8.66]**
expyear 0.029 0.023 0.043 0.042 0.049 0.078
[3.01]** [1.86] [9.33]** [8.62]** [4.06]** [13.74]**
expyear2 0 0 -0.001 0 -0.001 -0.001
[3.12]** [1.39] [7.68]** [3.83]** [3.35]** [12.52]**
headd 0.153 0.11 0.121 0.352 0.065 0.182
[2.05]* [1.47] [4.36]** [7.00]** [0.74] [4.20]**
urban 0.311 0.397 0.177 0.131 0.158 0.27
[3.68]** [5.84]** [6.55]** [1.91] [1.96]* [6.78]**
married 0.124 0.184 0.055 ..
[1.99]* [2.59]** [1.99]* ..
skillH .. . 0.361 0.811 0.556




formallab .. . 1.451 0.798 0.703
.. . [17.45]** [7.05]** [13.58]**
Constant 7.665 7.594 7.331 6.926 7.215 6.982
[52.30]** [37.71]** [98.81]** [83.49]** [34.98]** [72.40]**
Sample Size 758 693 3860 2544 776 3217
R-squared 0.21 0.22 0.28 0.44 0.42 0.42
Notes: Absolute value of t statistics in brackets
Significance level * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Source: Authors’ calculations.  See Essama et al. (2007). 
 
39Table A4:  Description of Variables used in the Analysis 
Variable name  Description 
Demographic variables, individual-level data 
gender   Dummy variable:1 male, 0 female 
age   Years of age 
nchild09  Number of children aged 0–9 in household 
nchild01   Number of children aged 0–1 in household 
headd    Dummy variable: 1 household head, 0 otherwise 
married  Dummy variable: 1 married couple, 0 otherwise 
urban   Dummy variable: 1 urban, 0 rural 
prov Regional  province  variable 
hhsize Household  size 
 
Education and experience, individual-level data 
eduyear   Number of years spent in school. Highest education completed.  
eduyear2 Number  of  years  spent in school-squared 
expyear   Experience measured as (=age-eduyear-5) 
expyear2   Experience-squared measured as (=age-eduyear-5)*squared  
eduyearhd  Years of schooling of head of the household 
skillH Professional,  semiprofessionals, technical occupations, managerial, 
executive administrative occupations, and certain transport 
occupations, such as pilot navigator  
skillM  Clerical occupations, sales occupations, transport, delivery and 
communications occupations, service occupations, farmer, farm 
manager, artisan, apprentice and related occupations, production 
foreman, production supervisor 
SkillL  Elementary occupations and domestic workers 
 
Income from employment and occupational categories, individual level data 
fwage Yearly  wage  income  in rand, formal workers 
fwagelog   Log of yearly wage income, formal workers 
Iwage  Yearly wage income in rand, informal workers 
iwagelog  Log of yearly wage income, informal workers 
selfincr  Yearly total self-employed income in rand 
seinclog   Log of yearly self-employed income 
fambusiness  Dummy variable: 1 someone in the household owns family 
business, 0 otherwise 
occhoice1   Dummy variables: 0 unemployed and inactive;1self-employed, 
agriculture; 2 informal wage employee; 3 formal wage employee 
occhoice2  Dummy variables:1 Inactive and unemployed; 2 formal sector 
workers, low-skilled in agriculture; 3 formal sector workers, semi-
skilled in agriculture; 4 formal sector workers, high-skilled in 
agriculture; 5 formal sector workers, low-skilled in industry; 6 
formal sector workers, semi-skilled in industry; 7 formal sector 
workers, high-skilled in industry; 8 formal sector workers, low-
skilled in services; 9 formal sector workers, semi-skilled in 
services; 10 formal sector workers, high-skilled in services; 11 
informal sector workers, agriculture; 12 informal sector workers, 
industry; 13 informal sector workers, services; 14 self-employed, 
agriculture; 15 self-employed, industry; and 16 self-employed, 
services  
40Economic sectors 
Primary sector  Includes agriculture, forestry, and fishing, mining and quarrying 
Secondary sector  Includes manufacturing, electricity, other utilities, and construction 
Tertiary sector  Includes trade, transport, financial, and business services; and 
social, personal, and community services 
Formallab  Dummy variable for formal labour: based on question asked in LFS 
2000. 
informallab  Dummy variable for informal labour: based on question asked in 
LFS 2000. 
 
Household aggregate expenditures and income variables, household level– 
data from income and expenditure survey 2000 
Household expenditures and  
consumer price index for 17  
household expenditure categories  
  Food, Non-alcoholic beverages, alcoholic beverages,  
  cigarettes, cigars, and tobacco, clothing and footwear  
  Housing, fuel and power, furniture and equipment, household 
operations, health, transport  
  Communication, recreation and entertainment, education, 
miscellaneous personal care,  
  Other miscellaneous goods and services  
Household aggregate income   Includes formal wage income, informal wage income, and self-
employed income from labour force survey, and other income from 
income and expenditure survey. 
Sources: LFS, 2000; IES, 2000. 
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